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- Changing the Rules of the Game: The Reform of (Corporate) Governance in Japan
Changing the Rules of the Game: The Reform of (Corporate) Governance in Japan
No.192
March 2004
Senior Economist Martin Schulz
ABSTRACT
Governance in Japan is moving from a system of stable "insider" relations to a more flexible model of market-based "outsider" or shareholder participation and control. This transformation remains costly and time consuming. But major changes in the commercial code, the bankruptcy code, accounting rules, shareholder structures, and labor market contracts have already irreversibly shifted the "rules of the game" towards a more open market economy. It is now necessary to enforce the implementation of these governance reforms by keeping a strong focus on transparency at every level, and by pushing the swift progress of the "accounting big bang" and the privatization of the postal savings system.
CONTENTS
- INTRODUCTION
- A JAPANESE STAKEHOLDER SYSTEM
- AN OLD SOLUTION: OPEN MARKETS
- WHY IS THE TRANSFORMATION SO SLOW?
- GOVERNANCE REFORM
- BLOCKED FINANCE
- CONCLUSION
- APPENDIX: THE "BUBBLE" AS A RESULT OF PARTIAL DEREGULATION
- LITERATURE