Transformations in Troop Deployment and the Okinawa Base Issue
November 10 (Thursday) 2005
The global development of the American military is in the midst of an historical transformation. This transformation comes in response to numerous important changes in environmental conditions.
The first major change is the U.S.'s "terrorist response". It can be said that, with the end of the post-war era's bipolar Cold War structure, the primary target of American military bases' vigilance shifted from open, armed conflict with communist nations to the more fatal -- yet invisible -- danger of terrorism. Second, "government burden" is another major change. In the effort to contain the communist countries by establishing forward bases in various countries throughout the world, the cost attendant with the development and maintenance of such bases has grown exorbitant for the U.S., and reducing this government burden has become a key issue. A third change is "technological innovation". As technological innovation in communications and delivery progresses, rapid deployment of the U.S. military from increasingly distant locations has become possible. Based on these major changes in environmental conditions, the U.S. military is moving to reduce its large-scale system of forward bases spread across the globe. In its place, the military is seeking to concentrate its functions in moderately removed strategic points, while at the same time reorganize the chain of command into a more efficient, global structure of information and network points.
Within this massive reorganization strategy, there will be several radical changes in deployment concerning Japan. A portion of the Far East Command's strategic deployment capabilities will be shifted, moving the headquarters of the U.S. Army I Corps from Washington State to Camp Zama, Kanagawa Prefecture. Additionally, 7000 Naval troops will be shifted from Okinawa to Guam, and the Naval base in south-central Okinawa is to be consolidated.
In Okinawa -- a vital part of this comprehensive shift in strategy by the U.S -- a rather vexatious issue is emerging. Specifically, this problem dates back to the talks triggered by the 1992 incident involving the rape of a young Okinawan girl by U.S. servicemen. The results of the deliberations that followed focused on the residents' longstanding demands for the U.S. military to leave Futenma airbase in favor of an alternate facility.
Futenma airbase is located in the center of a residential area, which would suffer enormous damage were any accidents or incidents to occur. Japan and the U.S. agreed to a plan that would move the base to a location with less impact on the surroundings in order to reduce unease and lessen the burden on Okinawa residents. Additionally, Governor Inamine set a limit of 15 years for the construction of an airstrip on the offshore reef near the Nago City-Henoko district, and attached a condition for the parallel establishment of a civilian airstrip. For its part, the U.S. did not readily accept these conditions, but as a result of serious efforts on the parts of local entities concerned, both governments consented and the agreement was confirmed in a cabinet meeting.
Following consent on transferring Futenma airbase, the agreement entered into the enforcement phase and a baseline survey was conducted regarding construction of the base, including various aspects such as its predicted environmental impact. For several years this phase dragged on with little progress, however, until this summer a new proposal arose suddenly out of Japan-U.S. negotiations. Instead of the terms decided in the original agreement, under the new proposal a smaller-scale base would be built at the Army's Camp Schwab. Both governments agreed to this new proposal as a part of the U.S. military's reorganization plans.
The Japanese government requested the citizens of Okinawa to accept the reorganization by touting its merits, including the return of several bases in the Makiminato area (due to the transfer of Futenma airbase and the consolidation of the base in central Okinawa), the expansion of capabilities as a result of lifting regulations on airspace over Naha Airport, and the transfer of 7000 Naval personnel to Guam. The reorganization entails considerable expenses, however, and as local residents did not appreciate having their considerable efforts toward the previous agreement ignored, the government now faces intense opposition.
For national defense, bases and arms are of course critical, but the strongest support comes from the understanding of the people. Above all things, the understanding and support of the Okinawan people, who have shouldered the brunt of the burden of U.S. bases, forms the linchpin of the Japan-U.S. security alliance.
It is undeniable that these most recent moves in base relocations show a lack of effort in satisfactorily gaining the Okinawan people's understanding through a sincere and thorough explanation. Japanese administration officials must cultivate a deeper awareness of the importance of earning the people's understanding and trust. Furthermore, in order for the Okinawan people to accept the government's sincerity, I hope to see mutual efforts toward building closer understanding between the government and the people.
